Philip Reny's approach to games with discontinuous utility functions can work outside its original context. The existence of Nash equilibrium and the possibility to approach the equilibrium set with a finite number of individual improvements are established, under conditions weaker than the better reply security, for three classes of strategic games: potential games, games with strategic complements, and aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions. MSC2010 Classification: 91A10; JEL Classification: C 72.
Introduction
made a significant step in the development of sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium existence in games with discontinuous utility functions. A feature common to games considered by Reny and most of his followers, see, e.g., McLennan et al. (2011 ) or Prokopovych (2013 , is that the strategy sets are convex and each utility function is quasiconcave in own argument. Bich (2009) relaxes the quasiconcavity, but not at all radically.
In this paper, we extend Reny's approach to three different classes of strategic games: potential games; games with strategic complements; aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions. Besides, our attention is switched from the mere existence of a Nash equilibrium to the possibility to approach the equilibrium set with a finite "individual improvement path." What unites the three classes is that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in none of them has anything to do with convexity. Moreover, it is much easier to prove and understand in the case of a finite game; in an infinite game, there may be no equilibrium at all, to say nothing of its approachability, without some topological assumptions. And for each class of games, we obtain a set of such assumptions that could not be derived from the previous literature.
1
Following Reny (2016) , we consider games with purely ordinal preferences, i.e., where utility functions take values from arbitrary chains rather than the real line. Inevitably, we only consider pure strategies. Our (i.e., essentially, Reny's) topological assumptions do not ensure the existence of the best responses; therefore, the standard fixed point theorems cannot be applied directly. Instead, we consider finite subgames, where Nash equilibria not only exist, but can be reached, starting from an arbitrary strategy profile, with a finite number of individual improvements. The "finite deviation" assumptions ensure the possibility to find a finite subgame every Nash equilibrium of which is arbitrarily close to the set of Nash equilibria of the original game. Thus, we obtain the "very weak finite improvement" property of the original game: the set of Nash equilibria is nonempty and can be approached with a finite number of individual improvements starting anywhere in the set of strategy profiles.
We understand potential games in a much broader sense than Monderer and Shapley (1996) , viz. we consider games where individual improvements are acyclic. Thus, our Theorem 1 generalizes the main result of Kukushkin (2011) , which in its turn generalized the good old "acyclicity plus open lower contour sets" theorem (Bergstrom, 1975; Walker, 1977) . As an application to economics, we show that the assumptions of Theorem 1 hold in a rather general class of Bertrand competition games (Propositions 4.1 and 4.2).
Strategic complements are also understood in a more general, ordinal sense, as in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , rather than in the cardinal one, as in Vives (1990) . Moreover, we do not fix a list of requirements a game must satisfy to deserve the badge of "Strategic Complements." The point is that there are various versions of the single crossing and quasisupermodularity conditions in the literature (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; LiCalzi and Veinott, 1992; Shannon, 1995; Quah, 2007; Quah and Strulovici, 2009; Kukushkin, 2013b) and "trade-offs" between them are possible, i.e., a stronger interpretation of one property coupled with a weaker interpretation of the other may have the same implications as a weaker interpretation of the first property together with a stronger interpretation of the second. Our Theorems 2 and 2 ′ extend the main result of Kukushkin et al. (2005) to infinite games, even with some strengthening.
While the only known way to establish the existence of an equilibrium in a potential game of Section 4 or an aggregative game of Section 6 consists in following improvement paths, in the case of strategic complements there is also an option of invoking Tarski's fixed point theorem, which ensures equilibrium existence without giving much information on better response dynamics (e.g., Theorem 5.1 of Vives (1990) establishes the convergence of Cournot tâtonnement to equilibrium only if the starting point belongs to a rather specific area in the set of strategy profiles). The fact that the mere existence of an equilibrium can be obtained under weaker assumptions than in our Theorem 2 may be of interest to some readers. (An anonymous referee even refused to see any value in studying improvement dynamics when the existence of an equilibrium can be established by other means.) Accordingly, a list of such assumptions is given in Proposition 5.1. A comparison with an earlier result on the existence of Nash equilibrium in a discontinuous game with a version of strategic complements, Theorem 2 of Prokopovych and Yannelis (2017) , is in Section 7.5.
In contrast to strategic complements, strategic substitutes, by themselves, are not conducive to the existence of Nash equilibrium. In a game with additive aggregation, however, they do ensure the existence of an equilibrium as was shown by Novshek (1985) , see also Kukushkin (1994) . Dubey et al. (2006) , having modified a construction invented by Huang (2002) for different purposes, created a tool applicable to some non-additive aggregation rules as well. Kukushkin (2005) used the tool to show the convergence of Cournot tâtonnement to equilibrium in aggregative games exhibiting strategic complements, strategic substitutes, or a combination of both. The most general description of aggregation rules for which that trick can still work was given by Jensen (2010) . Our Theorem 3 establishes the existence and approachability of Nash equilibrium in games with Jensen aggregation rules where the best responses may fail to exist. Section 2 contains basic definitions and notations associated with a strategic game. In Section 3, we reproduce Reny's original notions and more general topological conditions, which, via a technical Proposition 3.4, play the key role in the rest of the paper. In Sections 4, 5, and 6, we consecutively apply Proposition 3.4 to potential games, games with strategic complements, and aggregative games. Several related questions of secondary importance are discussed in Section 7. More complicated (or just tedious) proofs (of Proposition 3.2, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, Proposition 5.1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3) are deferred to Appendix.
Basic definitions
A strategic game Γ is defined by a finite set of players N and, for each i ∈ N , a strategy set X i , a chain C i (a utility scale), and a "generalized" utility function u i : X N → C i , where X N := ∏ i∈N X i is the set of strategy profiles. For each i ∈ N , we denote X −i := ∏ j∈N \{i} X j , and often use notation like
With every strategic game, we associate this individual improvement relation
By definition, a Nash equilibrium is a maximizer of the relation ◃ Ind on X N , i.e., a strategy profile
is defined. A strategic game Γ has the finite improvement property (FIP, Monderer and Shapley, 1996) iff there is no infinite improvement path. Γ has the weak finite improvement property (weak FIP ) iff, for every strategy profile x 0 N ∈ X N , there is a finite improvement path x 0 N , . . . , x m N such that x m N ∈ E(Γ). Obviously, FIP implies weak FIP: every improvement path in a game with FIP ends at a Nash equilibrium after a finite number of steps. Both properties look more natural for a finite game although they may be observed in an infinite game now and then.
Henceforth, the strategy sets X i are assumed to be topological spaces; each chain C i is endowed with its order interval topology; the sets X N , C N := ∏ i∈N C i , X −i , and X N ×C N are endowed with their product topologies. The topological closure of a subset Y of any one of those spaces is denoted cl Y . We say that Γ has the very weak FIP (Kukushkin, 2011) Remark. If X N is a metric space with a metric d, then the very-very weak FIP can be reformulated as follows: for every x 0 N ∈ X N and every ε > 0, there are y N ∈ E(Γ) and a finite improvement path
In this case, the difference between the very weak FIP and the very-very weak FIP is whether the same y N ∈ E(Γ) can be chosen for all ε > 0 or not. 
The proof is essentially the same as that of Proposition 2.1; only E(Γ) should be replaced with cl E(Γ).
Better-reply security and finite deviation
We start with auxiliary notations. Considering functions u i as components of a mapping u N : X N → C N , we denote G the graph of the mapping, i.e., the set of pairs ⟨x N , u N 
Then, we reproduce Reny's (1999) 
A game Γ is better-reply secure iff, whenever x N is not a Nash equilibrium and v N ∈Ḡ(x N ), some player i can secure a payoff strictly above v i at x N .
Let Y ⊆ X N be a set of strategy profiles and Z be a set of pairs ⟨i,
When Z is finite, we say that Y is finitely dominated (with Z).
A game Γ has the R-finite deviation property iff, for everyx N ∈ X N \ E(Γ), there is an open neighborhood ofx N which is finitely dominated. Γ has the P-finite deviation property iff, for everȳ
there is an open neighborhood of x N which is finitely dominated.
Y ⊆ X N is singly dominated iff it is dominated with a set Z containing at most one pair ⟨i,
there is an open neighborhood ofx N which is singly dominated. Γ has the P-single deviations property iff, for everyx
R-single (finite) deviation properties were introduced by Reny (2011) , under the names of just single (finite) deviation properties. P-single deviation property was introduced by Prokopovych (2013) , under the name of weak single deviation property. The other definitions are given here by analogy, for the completeness of the picture. This set of implications is obvious:
Example 3.1. Let us consider a strategic game Γ where N := {1, 2};
Clearly, E(Γ) = {(1, 0), (2, 0)}. Γ even has the FIP since x 2 can only decrease along any improvement path. The game has the R-finite deviation property, but not even Q-single deviation property: both x 1 = 1 and x 1 = 2 are necessary to dominate any open neighborhood of (0, 0).
A one-person game with the P-single deviation property, but without the R-finite deviation property is easy to produce. Example 4.2 presents a game with the Q-single deviation property, but without the P-finite deviation property.
Proposition 3.1. If a game Γ has the R-finite deviation property, then E(Γ) is closed.
A straightforward proof is omitted. Note that E(Γ) may be empty. Obviously, R-finite deviation cannot be replaced with P-single deviation. The statement is rather close to Reny (2011, Theorem 1) and Prokopovych (2013, Lemma 2) , and implies both. Since our assumptions are broader, a complete proof is given in Appendix, Section A. Proof. As in the case of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, the proofs of both assertions are essentially the same; only E(Γ) should be replaced with cl E(Γ) in the second case. We consider the first statement and apply the criterion established in Proposition 2.1.
is finitely dominated by Proposition 3.3. Let Z be an appropriate finite set of pairs. For each i ∈ N , we define
The sets X ′ i define a finite subgame Γ ′ of Γ; by our assumption, there is Γ ′′ such that Γ ′ ≤ Γ ′′ ≤ Γ and Γ ′′ has the weak FIP. Therefore, there is a finite improvement path
In the first case, we are home because x 0 N , . . . , x m N remains a finite improvement path in Γ. In the second case, we would have
and hence there would be ⟨i,
N ∈ X N were arbitrary, Proposition 2.1 is applicable indeed and we are home.
Potential games
The relation ◃ Ind is acyclic iff there is no finite improvement cycle, i.e., no improvement path for which
N with m > 0. A sufficient condition for that is the existence of a generalized ordinal potential (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) , i.e., a function P : Proof. Let Γ ′ be a finite subgame of Γ. Since ◃ Ind is acyclic in Γ, and hence in Γ ′ as well, Γ ′ even has the FIP. Therefore, Γ has the quasi weak FIP and hence Proposition 3.4 is applicable.
The assumptions of Theorem 1 are satisfied in Examples 4, 5, and 6 of Prokopovych and Yannelis (2017) . The first two games even have the weak FIP: no more than two individual improvements are needed to reach a Nash equilibrium from every strategy profile. Example 6 actually belongs to a rather general class of games covered by Theorem 1.
We define a simple Bertrand competition game (with linear production costs and without biting capacity constraints) as follows. There is a finite set N of firms capable of producing a homogenous good. Each firm i ∈ N is characterized by its constant marginal cost of production c i ≥ 0; its strategy is a price x i ∈ [c i , K i ] (dumping is forbidden). When all prices are announced, consumers buy at the cheapest. The total demand is given by an upper semicontinuous and decreasing function D : R + → R + . To avoid pathologies, we assume that
The firms which announced the lowest price share the total demand equally; the firms which announced higher prices produce nothing and sell nothing. Denoting M (x N ) := Argmin i x i ⊆ N , the utility functions are Theorem 1 is, thus, applicable whenever all firms have the same marginal cost of production. When a single firm is the most efficient producer, i.e., Argmin j∈N c j = {i}, the exact shape of the demand function D (to be more precise, what price(s) would be optimal for player i as a monopolist) starts to matter. Denotingc := min j̸ =i c j [> c i ] in this case, we formulate five similar, but distinct, conditions:
(
These implications hold: (1a) ⇒ (1b) ⇒ (1c) and (1a) ⇒ (1e) ⇐ (1d); the first follows from the upper semicontinuity of D; the others are obvious. All other implications between conditions (1) are, generally, wrong. (1b) and (1e) is sufficient for Γ to have the P-single deviation property and necessary for Γ to have the P-finite deviation property. (1c) and (1d) is sufficient for Γ to have the Q-single deviation property and necessary for Γ to have the Q-finite deviation property.
The conjunction of conditions

The disjunction of conditions
Condition (1e) is necessary and sufficient for Γ to have the very weak FIP property.
The disjunction of all conditions (1) is sufficient for Γ to have the very-very weak FIP property and necessary for Γ to possess a Nash equilibrium.
Intertwined proofs of both Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 are deferred to Appendix, Section B.
A simple Bertrand competition game may possess a Nash equilibrium without satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1. However, this situation is inherently unstable: an arbitrarily small perturbation of coefficients c j makes the theorem applicable. 
Proposition 4.3. Whenever a simple Bertrand competition game Γ possesses a Nash equilibrium, but does not satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1, there is a player j ∈ N such that for every
Example 4.1. Let us consider a simple Bertrand competition game Γ where N := {1, 2}; c 1 := 0; c 2 := 2; K 1 := K 2 := 10;
The demand is formed by two big buyers; each is willing to buy just one unit of the good; the highest acceptable price is 1 for one buyer and 3 for the other. Let us denote V (p) := pD(p) the profit of player 1 as a monopolist. Clearly, Argmax p∈ [0, 2] 
Of all conditions (1), only (1e) holds, so Theorem 1 is not applicable. By Proposition 4.2, Γ has the very weak FIP property.
If, everything else remaining the same, c 2 is greater than 2, then condition (1e) no longer holds and the Nash equilibrium disappears. If c 2 is slightly less than 2, then, in accordance with Proposition 4.3, even (1a) holds and E(Γ) becomes {x N ∈ X N | x 1 = 1, x 2 ≤ 2}. (1b) and (1c) hold. By Proposition 4.2, Γ has the Q-single deviation property, but not even the P-finite deviation property. Actually, the best response of player 1 is x 1 = 1 when x 2 > 1, and does not exist when
It is instructive to ascertain that Γ does not have the very weak FIP property, only the very-very weak FIP. Let us consider a strategy profile x N = (x 1 , 1) with x 1 < 1. Player 2 cannot improve at all; player 1 can improve choosing y 1 ∈ ]x 1 , 1[. Repeating such improvements, player 1 can, at most, realize an infinite improvement path converging to x ω N := (1, 1). Since x ω N belongs to cl E(Γ), but not to E(Γ), we see that there is no very weak FIP indeed. An interesting point is that an "infinite improvement cycle" is possible in Γ (where all improvements are done by player 1). Choosing x ω N as a starting profile, we inevitably move to (x 1 , 1) with x 1 < 1 at the first step, and then can return back to x ω N in the limit. If, everything else remaining the same, c 2 is greater than 1, then condition (1a) holds; hence the R-single deviation property obtains and E(Γ) becomes {x N ∈ X N | x 1 = 1}. If c 2 is slightly less than 1, then all conditions (1) are broken and all Nash equilibria disappear.
Strategic complements
We start with standard definitions useful for monotone comparative statics.
Let X and S be partially ordered sets (posets) and C be a chain. We say that a function u : X×S → C satisfies the single crossing conditions (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) iff, for all x, y ∈ X and s, s ′ ∈ S, there holds
u satisfies the weak single crossing condition (Shannon, 1995) iff
for all x, y ∈ X and s, s ′ ∈ S. Either condition (2) implies (3).
Let X be a lattice. A function u : X → C is quasisupermodular (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; LiCalzi and Veinott, 1992) 
When X is a chain, both conditions (4) are satisfied in a trivial way for every function u. Kukushkin (2013b) partitioned conditions (4) into four independent conditions, two of which will be used here:
A function u : X → C is weakly quasisupermodular (Shannon, 1995; LiCalzi and Veinott, 1992) iff, for all x, y ∈ X,
These implications are obvious:
Meanwhile, (4a) does not imply (6b), and (4b) does not imply (6a).
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a strategic game such that each strategy set X i is simultaneously a compact topological space and a distributive lattice. Let each utility function u i satisfy the condition (2a) with
X := X i , S := X −i , and C := C i . Let every function u i (·, x −i ) : X i → C i (i ∈ N , x −i ∈ X −i ) satisfy the condition (
5a). If Γ has the P-finite deviation property, then it has the very weak FIP. If Γ has the Q-finite deviation property, then it has the very-very weak FIP.
Essentially, this theorem follows from Proposition 3.4 above and Theorem 1 of Kukushkin et al. (2005) . Since the assumptions of the latter theorem were somewhat stronger than those made here, a complete proof is given in Appendix, Section C. Theorem 2 ′ . Let Γ be a strategic game such that each strategy set X i is simultaneously a compact topological space and a distributive lattice. Let each utility function u i satisfy the condition (2b) with X := X i , S := X −i , and
5b). If Γ has the P-finite deviation property, then it has the very weak FIP. If Γ has the Q-finite deviation property, then it has the very-very weak FIP.
The proof is dual to that of Theorem 2. To formulate a weaker set of assumptions that ensure the mere existence of a Nash equilibrium, we reproduce a definition from Kukushkin (2013b) . Given a game Γ and i ∈ N , a monotone pseudopartition of X −i consists of two subsets X The proof is deferred to Appendix, Section D.
Example 5.1. Let us consider a strategic game Γ where N := {1, 2, 3}, X i := {0, 1} ⊂ R (with the natural order) for each i ∈ N , and the utilities are defined by the following matrices (player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices; the axes are directed from left to right and from bottom to top):
Conditions (2) and (4) hold everywhere (the latter, trivially). There are two Nash equilibria: the leftmost bottom and the rightmost top. However, no improvement path started anywhere else ever reaches either of them. In other words, the assumptions imposed in Proposition 5.1 on i ∈ N 1 do not ensure the (very) weak FIP.
Example 5.2. Let us consider a strategic game Γ where N := {1, 2}, X 1 := X 2 := {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} ⊂ R 2 , X 2 := {0, 1} ⊂ R (both with the natural order), and the utilities are defined by the following matrices (player 1 chooses a position within a matrix, player 2 matrix itself; the axes are directed from left to right and from bottom to top):
] .
Conditions (3) and (6a) hold everywhere. There are two Nash equilibria: the leftmost bottom and the rightmost top. However, no improvement path started from the leftmost top or the rightmost bottom ever reaches either of them. In other words, the assumptions imposed in Proposition 5.1 on i ∈ N 2 do not ensure the (very) weak FIP.
Example 5.3. Let us consider a strategic game Γ where N := {1, 2}, X 1 := {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} ⊂ R 2 , X 2 := {0, 1} ⊂ R (both with the natural order), and the utilities are defined by the following matrices (player 1 chooses a position within a matrix, player 2 matrix itself; the axes are directed from left to right and from bottom to top):
The utility function of player 1 satisfies (3) and (6) everywhere. The utility function of player 2 satisfies (2) and, trivially, (4). However, there is no Nash equilibrium. In other words, combining weak versions of both single crossing and quasisupermodularity, we do not obtain even the mere existence of an equilibrium.
Aggregative games
We call a strategic game aggregative iff there are mappings σ i :
for all i ∈ N and x N ∈ X N . For each i ∈ N , we denote
An aggregative game is J-aggregative iff each strategy set X i is a poset, while there are mappings g :
Second, each F i has the strictly increasing differences property (Topkis, 1978) :
The intuition behind condition (8) can be explained as follows. Since the utility of each player i only depends on σ i (x −i ), we may assume that she only observes the aggregate, without knowing who chose what. Then (8) implies that she knows g(x N ) up to an additive term, which is beyond her influence anyway. It seems impossible to explain why (9) is needed without studying the proof of Theorem 3 in detail.
Remark. Jensen (2010) called a game satisfying conditions (7) and (8) "generalized quasi-aggregative"; a motivation for this terminology is given in Footnote 4 on p. 48 of that paper, see also the paragraph following Definition 2 on p. 49. The proof, based on Proposition 3.4 and a combination of ideas from Jensen (2010) and Kukushkin (2016) , is deferred to Appendix, Section E.
Since no monotonicity assumptions were imposed on σ i 's, the same conditions (2), (3), (5), and (6) have a different, more general meaning here than in Section 5. For instance, the signs of α ij 's in Example 6.1 may be arbitrary, so such a game may exhibit strategic complements, or strategic substitutes, or a combination of both ("strategic supplements"). In particular, if α ij = −1 for all i ̸ = j in Example 6.1, we obtain a game with strategic substitutes and additive aggregation, and hence our Theorem 3 immediately implies Theorem 3 of Novshek (1985) .
Even in the case of strategic complements, i.e., when all σ i 's are increasing, Theorem 3 adds something to the results of Section 5, giving the assertion of Theorem 2 under the assumptions of Proposition 5.1. Note that the games in Examples 5.1 and 5.2 are not aggregative, whereas that of Example 5.3 is.
Concluding remarks
7.1. The description of the preferences of the players with "generalized" utility functions is equivalent to the description with complete binary relations as in Reny (2016) . An even more general description would emerge if each C i were just a poset. Theorem 1 would remain valid in this case with the same proof, cf. Kukushkin (2011, Section 4.5). Whether Theorems 2 and 3 allow such a broad generalization is not clear at the moment; most likely, additional assumptions would be needed.
7.2.
The compactness assumption in Proposition 3.2 cannot simply be dropped. If each C i is just R, it boils down to the condition that each u i is bounded, both above and below. The fact that the proposition may become wrong without an upper bound on utilities may be demonstrated with a one-person game. As to the lower bound, two players are needed, but one of them may be a dummy.
Example 7.1. Let us consider a game where N := {1, 2}, X 1 := [0, 1], X 2 := {0}, and the utility mapping is this:
The game is better-reply secure since the graph G of the utility mapping u N is closed and a payoff strictly above u 1 (x N ) is secured by any y 1 ∈]0, 1[ if x 1 = 0, or by any
assumptions of Proposition 3.2 are satisfied except that u 2 is not bounded below. On the other hand, no open neighborhood of (0, 0) is finitely dominated; moreover, there is no Nash equilibrium.
As suggested by Reny (1999) himself, the proposition can be made applicable to unbounded utilities via a re-interpretation of better-reply security. Namely, we could perceive u N as a mapping X N →R N , whereR := {−∞} ∪ R ∪ {+∞}, and require the inequality in the definition to hold for vectors inḠ(x N ) with infinite coordinates as well. (It should be noted thatR is compact in its order interval topology.) In Example 7.1, G will no longer be closed under this interpretation,Ḡ(0, 0) = {(0, 0), (1, −∞)}, and player 1 cannot secure any payoff above 1. In other words, another assumption will fail and there will be no surprise in the absence of an equilibrium.
One could suspect the compactness assumption to imply that the preferences can actually be described with a real-valued utility function. However, this is not the case: if, e.g., C i is R × {0, 1} with the lexicographic order, then the closure of every bounded subset of C i is compact, but its embedding into the real line may be impossible (Wakker, 1988 , Lemma 3.1). Kukushkin (2011) , our Theorem 1 is an extension of the theorem of Bergstrom (1975) and Walker (1977) to strategic games. It even suggests a new generalization of that old theorem: An acyclic binary relation ◃ on a compact topological space X admits a maximizer if, whenever y ◃ x, there is an open neighborhood O of x and a finite set {z 1 , . . . , z m } ⊂ X such that for every x ′ ∈ O there is k for which z k ◃ x ′ . Funnily, this particular result seems to have never been published although there are quite a few even more straightforward generalizations in the literature.
Exactly as the main result of
It is interesting to note that no consistency between topology and order is needed in Theorem 2
and Theorem 3, which fact contrasts with Kukushkin (2016, Section 3). Moreover, the topology on each X i need not even be Hausdorff and the lattices need not be complete. On the other hand, we have to assume the lattices X i to be distributive in either theorem because we could not assert that Γ ′′ is finite otherwise. There may be weaker assumptions with the same implication, but, to my knowledge, all lattices in economics models are distributive.
7.5.
There is some superficial similarity between our Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 2 of Prokopovych and Yannelis (2017) ; however, that similarity should not be overestimated. Of the four principal assumptions of the latter theorem, two are stronger than corresponding assumptions here: X i 's are chains rather than lattices and the game has to be "better reply secure" (under a stronger, cardinal, interpretation of the property) rather than have Q-finite deviation property. The assumption of "upward or downward upper semicontinuity" has no counterpart here. Finally, the "approximate downward (or upward) transfer single-crossing" assumption, which presumes cardinal utility functions, is simply incomparable with our versions of the single crossing: it is not implied by (2) and does not imply (3). Unlike our conditions (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), that last assumption need not be inherited by subgames; therefore, a proof of Theorem 2 of Prokopovych and Yannelis (2017) in the style of our Proposition 5.1 seems impossible. It remains unclear, without a further study, whether their assumptions imply the very(-very) weak FIP.
7.6. The key role in the proof of Theorem 3 is played by a construction essentially invented by Jensen (2010) , who built on Huang (2002) , Dubey et al. (2006) , and Kukushkin (2005) . Unfortunately, there were technical oversights in Jensen (2010) : the proof needed stronger topological assumptions than were made explicitly (Jensen, 2012) . In a personal communication, Jensen conjectured that his main theorem is nonetheless valid as stated. Our Theorem 3 makes a significant step towards the vindication of his position.
Appendix: Proofs
A Proof of Proposition 3.2
Letx N ∈ X N . Since Γ is better-reply secure, for every
is not needed to provide an open cover ofḠ(x N ). Deleting such superfluous subsets, we obtain a subset M ⊆ N and, for each i ∈ M , a utility level α i ∈ C i , a strategy y i ∈ X i , and an open neighborhood
Remark. In principle, this claim belongs to textbook material. Since our assumptions are broader than usual, a complete proof is given.
Proof. We set
Since {x N }×F is compact, it is covered by a finite number of such neighborhoods:
Picking such an open neighborhood V , we define O :
B Proof of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2
In addition to M (x N ) := Argmin i x i defined in Section 4, we introduce these notations:
is the second price from the bottom ("Vickrey price"). Clearly, #M (
B.1 Acyclicity
As a first, trivial observation, we notice that u i (x N ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and x N ∈ X N , and hence the improving player must obtain a strictly positive profit. In particular, y i > c i and i ∈ M (y N ) whenever
Now suppose, to the contrary, that there is an improvement cycle, i.e., a sequence
Clearly, i(k) cannot be the same for all k; moreover, we may, without restricting generality, assume 
B.2 Single deviation: Sufficiency
First of all, for every x N ∈ X N and p ∈ R + , we fix and denote O * (x N , p) an open neighborhood of x N where all strict inequalities between components x i , as well as between them and p, are preserved, i.e., whenever
∈ E(Γ) and there is no problem with the R-single deviation property at this profile.
Henceforth, we assume A not to be the case, i.e.,
B. M (x N ) = {i}; then Argmin j∈N c j = {i} as well and m 2 (x N ) ≥c := min j̸ =i c j ≥x i , with at least one of the inequalities strict. We consider two alternatives.
B1. There is y
Being upper semicontinuous and decreasing, D is left continuous. Therefore, we may pick
, and hence there is no problem with the R-single deviation property at this profile.
. Then, obviously,x N ∈ E(Γ); therefore, nothing is required even for the R-single deviation property.
, and consider three alternatives.
C1. M + = ∅; then m(x N ) = min i∈N c i andx N ∈ E(Γ); again, nothing is required even for the R-single deviation property.
x N again. Thus, there is no problem with the R-single deviation property at this profile.
C3. M + = {i}. Similarly to the case B above, we have Argmin j∈N c j = {i} as well and
C3b. Let (1a) fail, i.e.,c ∈ Argmax
We consider further alternatives. C3bI. Let both (1b) and (1e) hold. Denoting V
, then x i ≤c and hence x N ∈ E(Γ). Thus, there is no problem with the P-single deviation property at this profile.
C3bII. Let (1c) hold. Then we pick c >c for whichc ∈ Argmax
, c] for all j ∈ M + \ {i} is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, x N ∈ cl E(Γ) and nothing is required of it if we want to establish the Q-simple deviation property. C3bIII. Let (1d) hold. For every ε > 0, we pick
Clearly, x ε N ∈ E(Γ) for every ε > 0, and hencex N ∈ cl E(Γ) with the same implications as in the case C3bII.
Let us summarize our findings. If # Argmin i∈N c i > 1, then everyx N ∈ X N belongs to one of the cases A, C1, or C2; in each of them, the R-simple deviation property has been established. Let Argmin j∈N c j = {i}. If (1a) holds, then, additionally, the cases B1, B2, and C3a become possible, in which, again, the R-simple deviation property has been established. If (1a) fails, but (1b) and (1e) hold, then C3a is replaced in the list with C3bI and we have the P-simple deviation property. Finally, if (1a) fails, but (1c) or (1d) holds, then C3a is replaced with C3bII or C3bIII, and in either case we have the Q-simple deviation property.
B.3 Necessity
Let Argmin j∈N c j = {i}, and let (1a) fail, i.e.,c ∈ Argmax
In the taxonomy of Section B.2, this profile belongs to the case C3; hence,x N / ∈ E(Γ). Let O ⊆ X N be an open neighborhood ofx N and Z be a finite set of pairs ⟨j,
Claim B.3.1. O is not dominated with Z.
Proof. 
, the inequality in the middle following from the negation of (1a).
Thus, there is no R-finite deviation property without (1a).
A straightforward proof, based on the left continuity of D, is omitted. 
Thus, there is no P-finite deviation property without (1b) and (1e).
Proof. The negation of (1d) 
B.4 Very weak FIP: Sufficiency
Let Argmin j∈N c j = {i}, and let condition (1e) hold. If (1b) also holds, then Γ has the P-single deviation property and hence the very weak FIP as well; so let (1b) fail, and hence (1a) fail too. We want to show that the set E(Γ) can be approached starting from any x 0 N ∈ X N . If x 0 N ∈ E(Γ), we are home immediately. For every x N ∈ X N , we denote m −i (x N ) := min j̸ =i x j [≥c]. Then we pick
, which is possible because of (1e), and set
Proof. We note first that m −i (x N ) ≥c in any case. Then we consider four alternatives. 
We pick j ̸ = i for which c j =c and define x * N by x 
C Proof of Theorem 2
In light of Proposition 3.4, it is enough to show that Γ has the quasi weak FIP. Let Γ ′ ≤ Γ be finite; for each i ∈ N , we define X ′′ i as the minimal sublattice of X i containing X ′ i . Since X i is distributive, X ′′ i is still finite. The subsets X ′′ i define a subgame Γ ′′ ≤ Γ, which inherits conditions (2a) and (5a) from Γ. Now we can argue similarly to the proof of Theorem 1 of Kukushkin et al. (2005) . We define
Clearly, ≻ is irreflexive and transitive. 
Suppose the contrary: there are j ∈ N and y j > z j such that
Let us consider two alternatives.
would contradict x N ∈ X ↓ while y i < x i would contradict the choice ofz i ; therefore, we have to assume that y i and x i are incomparable, hence
and hence, by (11) and (5a),
Thus, we are led to j ̸ = i; hence y j > z j = x j and z −j < x −j . Now (11) and (2a) imply
, we start building an improvement path, applying Claim C.1 at each step, i.e., picking
Since ≻ is an order, we cannot return back. Since X ′′ N is finite, we reach E(Γ ′′ ) at some stage.
D Proof of Proposition 5.1
Supposing the contrary, we may apply Proposition 3.3 to the whole X N and obtain a finite set Z of pairs ⟨i ∈ N, y i ∈ X i ⟩ such that for every x N ∈ X N there holds (
x N for (at least) one ⟨i, y i ⟩ ∈ Z. Then we argue similarly to the proof of Proposition 3.4. Fixing an arbitrary x 0 N ∈ X N , we, for each i ∈ N , define X ′ i as {x 0 i } ∪ {y i | ⟨i, y i ⟩ ∈ Z} ⊆ X i and X ′′ i as the minimal sublattice of X i containing X ′ i . Then X ′′ i is still finite. The subsets X ′′ i define a subgame Γ ′′ ≤ Γ, which inherits appropriate conditions (2), (3), (5), or (6) from Γ.
For each i ∈ N , we define the best response correspondence:
. By Proposition 28 from Kukushkin (2013b) in the case of i ∈ N 1 , or by Proposition 26 from the same paper in the case of i ∈ N 2 , the correspondence R i is weakly ascending in the sense of Veinott (1989) :
Therefore, by Theorem 3.2 of Veinott (1989) , or, easier to find, Proposition 2.5 from Kukushkin (2013a) , there exists an increasing selection r i from R i . Applying Tarski's fixed point theorem to the Cartesian product of r i 's, we obtain that E(Γ ′′ ) ̸ = ∅. On the other hand, the choice of X ′ i ensures that, for every x N ∈ X ′′ N , there is y N ∈ X ′′ N such that y N ◃ Ind x N , i.e., E(Γ ′′ ) = ∅. The contradiction proves that E(Γ) ̸ = ∅.
E Proof of Theorem 3
In light of Proposition 3.4, it is enough to show that Γ has the quasi weak FIP. Let Γ ′ ≤ Γ be finite. Exactly as in the case of Theorem 2, we define X ′′ i , for each i ∈ N , as the minimal sublattice of X i containing X ′ i . Then X ′′ i is still finite. To establish that Γ ′′ has the weak FIP, we argue similarly to Jensen (2010) or rather Kukushkin (2016) . For each i ∈ N , we define the best response correspondence:
Since X ′′ i is finite, R i (s i ) ̸ = ∅ for each s i ∈ S ′′ i . Exactly as in the proof of Proposition 5.1, Propositions 26 and 28 from Kukushkin (2013b) plus Theorem 3.2 of Veinott (1989) or Proposition 2.5 from Kukushkin (2013a) imply the existence of an increasing selection r i from R i . Henceforth, we fix such a selection for each i ∈ N and denote X 0 i := r i (S ′ i ). Clearly, X 0 i ⊆ X ′′ i is a chain. Now, we introduce this admissible best response improvement relation ◃ BR on X ′′ N (i ∈ N , y N , x N ∈ X ′′ N ):
Since r i (x −i ) is defined for every x −i ∈ X ′′ −i , every maximizer of ◃ BR on X ′′ N is a Nash equilibrium in Γ ′′ . Since X ′′ N is finite, it is sufficient to show that ◃ BR is acyclic. We achieve this objective by producing an order potential of ◃ BR , i.e., an irreflexive and transitive binary relation ≻ on X ′′ N such that 
Now, we are ready to define our potential, a binary relation on X ′′ N :
Obviously, ≻ is irreflexive and transitive. Let us assume N 0 (y N ) = N 0 (x N ), i.e., x i ∈ X 0 i . Taking into account (12), we can rewrite (13) as
Let us assume that x i > y i ; then κ i (y i ) ≤k < κ i (x i ). Subtracting (15a) from (15b), we obtain
) .
By (9), the difference is strictly positive. Therefore, y N ≻ x N by the second term in (14). Now let us assume that x i < y i ; then κ i (x i ) < κ i (y i ) ≤k. Subtracting (15a) from (15b), we obtain
By (9), the difference is non-negative; it can only be zero if κ i (y i ) =k = κ i (x i ) + 1. Thus, y N ≻ x N by the second or the third term in (14).
To summarize, we established that the admissible best response improvement relation ◃ BR is acyclic on X ′′ N . Starting from x 0 N ∈ X ′′ N an admissible best response improvement path in Γ ′′ , we inevitably reach a Nash equilibrium at some stage. Therefore, Γ ′′ has the weak FIP.
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